Massive defence budgets, advanced Western weaponry, and high-profile arms deals have long been presented as proof of Saudi Arabia’s military strength. Yet the reality on the ground tells a different story. The losses sustained during the Yemen war—including the destruction of dozens of advanced tanks and repeated border breaches—cannot be explained by technical limitations or lack of equipment. Instead, they point to a deeper structural flaw within the military institution itself.
This is the core argument put forward by former US intelligence analyst Michael Shurkin, who identifies the root of the problem not in hardware, but in the system that governs how the military operates. According to this assessment, Saudi Arabia’s armed forces are shaped less by professional merit and more by political loyalty—creating a force that appears powerful on paper but struggles in real combat scenarios.
At the heart of the issue is the officer corps. Promotions, as highlighted in Shurkin’s analysis, are often tied to personal connections and loyalty to the ruling system rather than operational performance or battlefield experience. This approach does more than weaken internal administration—it directly impacts decision-making in combat. In any military structure, leadership determines effectiveness. When leadership is selected based on allegiance rather than competence, the result is predictable: reduced operational capability, poor coordination, and limited adaptability under pressure.
This structural weakness cannot be compensated for by acquiring advanced weapons. Systems like the M1A2 Abrams tank require highly trained crews, integrated command structures, and a coherent doctrine to be used effectively. Reports indicating the destruction of more than 50 M60 tanks and over 20 Abrams tanks during the Yemen conflict highlight a critical failure—not of technology, but of usage.
Field reporting over the years, including coverage by Reuters, has consistently pointed to challenges faced by Saudi ground forces despite their technological superiority. These challenges stem from a lack of cohesive military doctrine, insufficient coordination, and leadership gaps. In such an environment, advanced equipment becomes underutilized—or even a liability.
Another structural factor further complicates the picture: the fragmentation of military power. The existence of parallel security and military structures—effectively “two armies”—is designed to maintain internal political balance and reduce the risk of power consolidation. While this may serve regime stability, it comes at the cost of operational efficiency. Divided command structures weaken coordination and prevent the formation of a unified, professional fighting force.
This dynamic helps explain why smaller forces, such as those of the UAE, are often assessed as more operationally effective despite having fewer resources. The issue is not scale, but organization.
Analyses from institutions such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies have repeatedly noted that militaries governed by political considerations rather than professional standards tend to underperform. In Saudi Arabia’s case, the military functions as an extension of the political system rather than as an independent institution guided by strategic doctrine.
This leads to a fundamental limitation: the problem cannot be solved simply by spending more money. Additional arms purchases or foreign training programs may address technical gaps, but they do not resolve the underlying issue. Military effectiveness depends on institutional culture—merit-based promotion, accountability, and professional autonomy. Without these elements, structural weaknesses persist regardless of investment levels.
Ultimately, the Saudi military reflects the system that shapes it. When political stability takes precedence over institutional efficiency, the armed forces are designed to protect the regime rather than to maximize battlefield effectiveness.
The result is a clear contradiction: a military that ranks among the world’s top spenders, equipped with some of the most advanced systems available, yet unable to consistently translate these advantages into operational success. This is not a temporary setback, but a systemic issue—one that will remain unresolved as long as loyalty continues to outweigh competence.
